Thu Jul 22 15:16:25 PDT 2010
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http://www.slony.info/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=142 Christopher Browne <cbbrowne at ca.afilias.info> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- AssignedTo|slony1-bugs at lists.slony.inf |cbbrowne at ca.afilias.info |o | Status|NEW |ASSIGNED Depends on| |141 --- Comment #1 from Christopher Browne <cbbrowne at ca.afilias.info> 2010-07-22 15:16:25 PDT --- Reviewing... The requirement for superuser is actually *really* shallow. There are only two places where updates are done to the catalog (e.g. - updates to tables in pg_catalog): 1. In altertablerestore(), which is an obsolete function. See bug #141. This function should be removed, in bug #141. 2. In preparetableforcopy() and finishtableaftercopy(), there are updates to pg_class to "hack" relhasindex. I propose to add a pair of security definer functions to activate/deactivate the indices. We do NOT need a config parameter for slon; instead, we just need to have a superuser role available during UPDATE FUNCTIONS, and to do two things there: - Claim the superuser role briefly - ALTER ownership on the two new functions - Set the functions as security definers -- Configure bugmail: http://www.slony.info/bugzilla/userprefs.cgi?tab=email ------- You are receiving this mail because: ------- You are on the CC list for the bug. You are the assignee for the bug.
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